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None of us has health insurance, really. If you
develop a long-term condition such as heart dis-
ease or cancer, and if you then lose your job or are
divorced, you can lose your health insurance. You
now have a preexisting condition, and insurance
will be enormously expensive—if it’s available at all.
Free markets can solve this problem, and pro-
vide life-long, portable health security, while
enhancing consumer choice and competition.
“Heath-status insurance” is the key. If you are
diagnosedwith a long-term, expensive condition,
a health-status insurance policy will give you the
resources to pay higher medical insurance pre-
miums. Health-status insurance covers the risk
of premium reclassification, just as medical
insurance covers the risk of medical expenses.
With health-status insurance, you can always
obtain medical insurance, no matter how sick
you get, with no change in out-of-pocket costs.
With health-status insurance, medical insur-
ers would be allowed to charge sick people more
than healthy people, and to compete intensely
for all customers. People would have complete
freedom to change jobs,move, or changemedical
insurers. Rigorous competition would allow us
to obtain better medical care at lower cost.
Most regulations and policy proposals aimed at
improving long-term insurance—including those
advanced in Barack Obama’s presidential cam-
paign—limit competition and consumer choice by
banning risk-based premiums, forcing insurers to
take all comers, strengthening employer-based or
other forced pooling mechanisms, or introducing
national health insurance.
The individual health insurance market is
already moving in the direction of health-status
insurance. To let health-status insurance emerge
fully, we must remove the legal and regulatory
pressure to provide employer-based group insur-
ance over individual insurance and remove regu-
lations limiting risk-based pricing and competi-
tion among health insurers.
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The Problem of Long-Term
Insurance
None of us has health insurance, really.
Most Americans have coverage through their
employer, or the employer of a parent or
spouse. But suppose you get cancer, heart
disease, HIV, have a stroke, discover a genetic
defect, or develop any other long-term expen-
sive health problem—and then lose your job,
divorce, outgrow your parents’ plan, or your
employer or insurer goes out of business. You
lose your health coverage. You now have a
preexisting condition, and insurance will be
enormously expensive—if it’s available at all.
This happens to real people. A significant
and expensive health problem is a common
root cause of catastrophic economic descents
in the United States. Many people stick with
bad jobs or bad marriages just to keep their
health insurance.
The lack of secure, long-term, portable
health insurance is the greatest single problem
with our current health care system. Solving
this problem is a central goal of every health
care reform proposal from all parts of the
political spectrum. There are plenty of other
problems with our health sector: the unin-
sured, hospitals’ hotel-minibar pricing poli-
cies, poor information, the drudgery of useless
paperwork, cost recovery of new medicines,
optimal copayment levels, and soon. But all of
these are fairly clear problems, each limited in
its reach, with fairly clear remedies. The lack of
long-term insurance, by contrast, seems a
harder nut to crack. Andunlike, say, the plight
of the uninsured, it is a problem that faces
each of us directly.
Free and competitive markets are the best
way to spur innovation, provide better service,
and reduce costs. So far, however,manypeople
have thought that competition undermines
long-term insurance, leading to the extensive-
ly regulated market we now face and to pro-
posals for further regulation. Health-status
insurance lets us break out of this dilemma.
Health-status insurance can give us both com-
pletely portable, lifetime health insurance and
great individual freedom of choice in a dereg-
ulated, competitive—and hence—efficient and
innovative market.
Unsurprisingly, health-status insurance re-
quires a thoughtful deregulation of insurance
markets, starting with an end to the strong
tax and regulatory preference for employer-
provided group coverage. It does not need a
new layer of regulation. The small individual
insurance market is already starting to feel its
way toward health-status insurance. The
deregulatory path will allow this effort to
blossom fully.
Health-Status Insurance
Market-based lifetimehealth insurance has
two components: medical insurance and
health-status insurance.1 Medical insurance
covers your medical expenses in the current
year, minus deductibles and copayments.
Health-status insurance covers the risk that
your medical insurance premiums will rise. If
you get a long-term condition that moves you
into a more expensive medical insurance pre-
mium category, health-status insurance pays
you a lump sum large enough to cover your
higher medical insurance premiums, with no
change in out-of-pocket expenses.
Why can’t medical insurers just charge
everyone the same premium? In a competitive
market,medical insurersmust charge sickpeo-
ple higher premiums, and charge healthy peo-
ple lower premiums. If an insurer charged
everyone the same price, then a competitor
could woo away healthy low-cost customers,
and the original insurer would go out of busi-
ness. Furthermore, the main reason insurance
companies refuse coverage, deny coverage for
preexisting conditions, ormore subtly avoid or
mistreat people with long-term expensive con-
ditions, is that they cannot charge thosepeople
enough to cover their costs. Ifmedical insurers
can charge enough, they will compete for the
business of every customer, even the sickest.
Freely risk-rated, competitive medical insur-
ance gives everyone access, albeit at a cost. It
leaves people vulnerable to the financial risk of
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large premium increases, but health-status in-
surance would fill that gap.
The combination of health-status insur-
ance and competitive, freely priced medical
insurance solves the central problem of our
current health insurance market: the lack of
real, long-term, portable health security. With
health-status insurance, you can always get
medical insurance, no matter if you get sick,
change or lose jobs, move, divorce, take some
time out of the labor force, or even let your
medical insurance lapse. The lump-sum pay-
ment from the health-status insurer means
you can always pay your medical insurance
premiums.
Health-status insurance would also give
each of us much greater freedom and choice.
No matter how sick you become, you would
always be free to change medical insurers.
You could always afford the higher premi-
ums a new medical insurer will demand, just
as you could afford the higher premiums
your current insurer will require. You would
not depend on the good treatment of one
insurer, the vagaries of one group, the link to
one employer, or the bureaucratic decisions
of one government-provided plan.
Best of all, when every consumer is free to
switch insurers at any time, medical insur-
ance companies will compete for everyone’s
business. They will compete for the business
of expensive, high-risk customers, rather
than try to get rid of them or “contain their
costs.” They can also compete for the busi-
ness of people who are currently healthy, as
such competition will not undermine the
implicit cross-subsidy to people with preex-
isting conditions. Constant competition for
every consumer will have the same dramatic
effects on cost, quality, and innovation in
health care as it does in every other industry.
In sum, health-status insurance can simul-
taneously give us complete and portable long-
term insurance, great individual choice, and
cost-containment beyond the dreams of any
health policy planner. And, as I show below, it
doesn’t cost consumers anything. The com-
binedhealth-status andmedical insurancepre-
miums are the same as those of a lifetime indi-
vidual insurance contract, and the same in pre-
sent value terms as those of a (hypothetical)
successful group or pooling program, even
before we factor in cost savings from greater
competition.
An Illustration
Suppose that a healthy 25-year-old male
will incur $2,000 worth of medical expenses
in a year, on average. A competitive medical
insurance market will offer him insurance
with a $2,000 premium, plus administrative
costs and profit.
Suppose that, along with potential short-
term illnesses, he has a 1 percent chance of
developing a chronic condition that will raise
his average medical expenses to $10,000 per
year. If he develops this condition, a compet-
itive medical insurance market will still cover
him in following years, but his annual med-
ical insurance premiummust rise to $10,000,
plus costs and profit. This is a large financial
setback.
To be covered over the long term, then, he
needs a lump-sum payment large enough to
cover $8,000 per year in additional medical
insurance premiums. At a 5 percent interest
rate, that sum is $148,370.2 The premium for
health-status insurance is 1percentof that val-
ue, $1,483.70, plus administrative costs and
profit. In sum, he pays $2,000 for one year of
medical insurance, plus $1,483.70 for health-
status insurance, for a total of $3,483.70 in
out-of-pocket expenses in the first year. Now
he is completely covered, for short-term and
for chronicmedical expenses. If he gets sick, he
is also still free to change medical insurers,
with no change in out-of-pocket expenses.
This example is simplistic, of course. Brad-
ley Herring and Mark Pauly use data on the
incidence of a long list of chronic diseases to
provide a realistic estimate of the sumofmed-
ical and health-status insurance premiums.3
Their estimate of annual medical insurance
premiums for a low-risk male rises from $800
at age 25 to $3,038 at age 55, while a high-risk
malepays$2,300at age25and rises to$10,023
at age 55. Clearly, jumping from the low-risk
to the high-risk category implies a large finan-
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cial penalty. They estimate that the combined
medical and health-status premium starts at
$1,487 at age 25 and rises to $3,936 at age 55.
Subtracting, health-status premiums are $687
at age 25, and rise to $898 at age 55. Total pre-
miums for younger people are lower than for
older people, unlike in my example. That fact
reassures us that young healthy people, who
typically have lower incomes than older peo-
ple, will not shy away from purchasing insur-
ance.
Health-Status Insurance Accounts
Lump-sum payments from health-status
insurers should go into a special “health-sta-
tus insurance account” that can only be used
to pay medical insurance premiums or med-
ical expenses. This contractual requirement
solves many problems associated with large
lump-sum payments, and it makes health-sta-
tus insurance less expensive, for three reasons.
First, large lump sums are a temptation to
fraud—get a fake diagnosis, take the money,
anddisappear. That’smuch less tempting if all
you can do with the money is buy medical
insurance. Second, people who receive a large
lump-sumpaymentmay choose to spend it on
other things and then show up in the emer-
gency room, unable to pay their bills. It is in
both consumers’ and insurers’ interest to pre-
commit against this option. Third, this provi-
sion makes it feasible to require that you
return the lump sum if your medical insur-
ance premiums decline because you become
unexpectedly healthier. In this circumstance,
you no longer need the lump sum, so promis-
ing its returndoesnothurt you.Returning the
unneeded lump sum lowers costs and thus
reduces premiums for everyone. Of course, if
your health status deteriorates again, you will
receive another lump sum.
Health-status insurance accounts are not
the same as health savings accounts. Health
savings accounts are tax-preferred savings
vehicles. You choose when to putmoney into
a health savings account, you can withdraw
money for nonmedical purposes (with a
penalty), and you can pass the assets on to
your heirs. Health-status insurance accounts
are funded by payments from an insurance
company, they can only be used for medical
insurance premiums, and they should not be
inheritable. Legally, health-status insurance
accounts would be set up like a trust account.
However, health savings accounts are a
great first step, as they establish a legal and
regulatory framework for accounts that are
limited in some ways to health-related uses.
Now, markets only need to create (and regu-
lators need to allow) a variant of something
that already exists, rather than something
completely new.
Calculating Payments
Calculating present values of premiums
sounds complicated. However, in the real
worldwe don’t insure people down to the last
dollar, so it is not necessary to key health-sta-
tus payments precisely to the exact present
value of each person’s premium for a given
plan’s premium schedule. Home insurance
markets work, even though the payment is
never equal to the exact value of the home.
Health-status insurance companies could
offer three or four levels of coverage, keyed to
surveys of the costs of three or four standard
levels of medical coverage. Similarly, medical
insurers would probably have a short num-
ber of classifications, say a 1–10 scale of “low
risk” to “high risk,” rather than publish a pre-
mium schedule for every conceivable disease
history. This would make their job and the
health-status insurer’s job much easier at a
small cost.
A health-status insurance contract could
then be very simple. For example, the policy
could say “pays $50,000 if you are reclassified
from category 3 to category 5.” A simple table
could advise people in a given medical insur-
ance plan that this is the right level of coverage.
Interruptions
Health-status insurance can provide long-
term security through interruptions or
changes in medical insurance.
As soon as you stop making premium pay-
ments with a conventional insurance contract,
you lose any right to lowpremiumsandtocon-
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tinuedcoverageof your (nowpreexisting)med-
ical conditions. This happens. People who lose
their jobs often can continue their health
insuranceunderCOBRA—if theypay theentire
premium, including what used to be the
employer’s portion. But this privilege doesn’t
last forever, and people who just lost their jobs
often have trouble paying premiums, especial-
ly if the job loss coincides with an expensive ill-
ness.4 People who take time off from work to
raise a family, or lose their connection tohealth
insurance through divorce, don’t have any
right to continue coverage in the first place.
By contrast, anyone with a health-status
insurance account can switch to a lower-cost
medical plan, or miss some period of medical
coverage entirely in a time of economicmisfor-
tune, and retain protection against the costs of
their long-term illnesses.When they’re ready to
reestablish medical insurance, or move to a
more expensive medical insurance plan, the
health-status account is there and waiting. If
they maintain health-status insurance, even
without medical insurance, they can be pro-
tected against any new long-term illness.
Changing Tastes and Quality
Suppose you purchase an economicalmed-
ical plan andhealth-status insurance. You con-
tract a high-cost condition. What if you then
decide you want to move to a more expensive
medical plan?
Insurance can covermisfortune, but it can’t
cover changing tastes. If youwant tomove to a
more expensive plan, you’re going to have to
pay more. However, insurance companies
could sell, and you could buy, economical
medical insurance together with health-status
insurance that covers changes in a more ex-
pensivemedical plan’s premiums. In the above
example, you could opt for a policy that pays
$70,000 rather than $50,000 if you are reclassi-
fied from category 3 to category 5. That would
cost a little bit more, but if you get sick, a larg-
er sum will be deposited in your health-status
insurance account. This option would be
attractive for young people or people in tem-
porarily reduced circumstances. Home and car
insurers will not let you be “overinsured,” de-
claring a $100,000 value for a $20,000 car, for
obvious reasons. But since you can’t do any-
thing but buymedical insurance with the pay-
outs, there is no such worry with health-status
insurance.
What about People Who Are Already
Sick?
Private insurance cannot cover events that
have already happened. You can’t tell an insur-
ance company, “My house just burned down.
How about some insurance?”
Many people feel that government should
insure events that have already happened,
especially when no insurance was available
and the unfortunate are in some sense blame-
less. Health-status insurance accounts offer a
good way to help people who are already sick.
The government could simply deposit money
in an individual’s health-status insurance
account and then get out of the way. Private
charities could help people in the same way.
This is much more straightforward, flexible,
and less distortionary ofmarkets than directly
running a government-sponsored health
insurance plan, or forcing private insurers to
take such patients and treat themwell.
The problem of people who have preexist-
ing conditions ismost critical at startup,when
people will not yet have had a chance to buy
health status insurance. Once health-status
insurance is widely available, people will be
able to insure against more events than one
might think. Parents could buy family insur-
ance that provides health-status insurance
accounts for their children. Then, children
who develop rare long-term diseases would be
covered for life without government interven-
tion.Health-status insurance could even apply
to unborn children, and thus insure against
genetic defects from birth.
Having the government set up such
accounts for people with preexisting condi-
tionsmight also be useful in getting thewhole
process going. This step would establish the
legal and regulatory framework for health-sta-
tus insurance accounts, and it could be done
at the same time government deregulates pre-
miums: regulators and legislators would be
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more willing to allow free risk-rating if they
knew that the most vulnerable populations
could afford the extra payments.
Other Implementations
The contracts I have described, combining
competitiveone-yearmedical insurancepolicies
with health-status insurance payments held in
acustodialaccount, showmostclearlyhowfree-
market long-term insurance can work.
However, markets may devise many other
implementationsthatmaybemoreattractive to
consumers, insurers, and regulators—even if
they don’t seem as elegant to economists.
Consumers could purchase health-status
insurance andmedical insurance fromdiffer-
ent companies. Since health-status insurance
is largely a financial transaction, a financial
services company might be able to handle it
better than amedical insurance company.On
the other hand, consumers may prefer to
have the two forms of insurance bundled as
“long-term health insurance” and not worry
about two separate contracts.
The health-status insurance account need
not be settled up every year. For example, you
could have a long-term medical insurance
policy inwhich health-status payments occur
only when you leave. On the other hand, with
insurance—as in all social endeavors, there is
less chance of a dispute if long-term debts are
settled up more frequently and in smaller
chunks, rather than in one large chunk after
one party has already decided to leave.
Rather than an accountwith a dollar figure
in it, your health-status insurer could simply
promise to pay any increases in medical insur-
ance premiums. The exact kinds of payment
would have to be spelled out in some detail,
either by specifying the qualifying plans or by
specifying howmuch extra will be paid out for
various risk conditions, but that’s fairly
straightforward in practice. In this implemen-
tation, we wouldn’t have to worry about the
insurer retrieving lump-sumpayments if a per-
son gets healthier. You would still be depen-
dent on a long-term contract, but it is much
more reliable to receive an annuity from a
financial services company than it is to rely on
a long-term promise from amedical insurance
company.Plus, youwouldstillhave the right to
choose anymedical insurer you want.
You could just have a transferability right
rather than a health-status insurance account.
Your current insurer could agree that, when
youwant to leave, itwill pay a lumpsumtoany
new insurer, such that the new insurer will
now be willing to take you in a plan of similar
quality with no change in your out-of-pocket
expenses. The lump sum could be the same
amount that your current insurer charges to
take on anewcustomer of your age andhealth
status. Transferability obviously would not
give consumers quite as much freedom as a
health-status insurance account with real
money in it, but it might work almost as well
in practice and might be simpler for con-
sumers to understand.
Choice and Security
Why not just mandate that premiums
cannot rise when you get sick? As it happens,
federal law already requires that individually
purchased medical insurance be “guaranteed
renewable,”meaning that the insurance com-
pany cannot drop you or increase your pre-
miums if you get sick.
There are two problems with this arrange-
ment. First, as with all pooling arrangements,
simple long-term insurancepolicies areunder-
mined by competition. Second, if you get sick
you depend on the good graces of one compa-
ny, for the rest of your life, as nobody else will
take you. It is possible to fix the first problem,
and markets are heading in that direction
already. The second problem remains, and
health-status insurance is the natural remedy.
To see the first problem, return to the
above illustration, in which there is a 1 per-
cent probability that a person’s expected
medical expenses would transition from
$2,000 per year to $10,000 per year in the first
year of an insurance contract. The average
medical costs for all individuals would be
(0.99 x $2,000) + (0.01 x $10,000) = $2,080.
It seems the insurer could break even by offer-
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ing guaranteed-renewable policies for $2,080
per year. However, if there is any competition,
this arrangement will fall apart after the first
year. Another insurer charging just $2,000 per
year could woo away all the healthy people.
The same competitive pressures unravel
forced-pooling arrangements, as discussed
below.
Fortunately,markets can solve thisproblem
by front-loading thepremiums.5 If eachperson
pays $3,483.70 in the first year and $2,000 in
subsequent years, the insurer will still break
even, but healthy people will no longer have an
incentive to leave. Even if another insurer lures
them away, the additional first-year premiums
would cover the long-term costs of the people
who got sick. Bradley Herring andMark Pauly
call this an “incentive-compatible” guaranteed-
renewable contract.6
Notice that the premiums and calculations
of an incentive-compatible guaranteed-renew-
able insurance policy are exactly equal to the
combined premiums of a medical insurance
policy plus a health-status insurance policy,
and the present value of both is the same as
those of a $2,080-per-year pooling arrange-
ment, if the latter could be made to work.
More importantly, a health-status plus med-
ical insurance policy is exactly equivalent to an
incentive-compatible guaranteed-renewable
policy, in which the insurance company peri-
odically “marks to market” its long-term
obligations to the customer, or the twoparties
occasionally settle up the long-term debt
implied by the promise to treat the expensive
customer. At the end of the first year, the
insurance company selling guaranteed-renew-
able coverage should look at each patient who
developed a long-term illness and say, “This
person is going to cost us (say) $8,000per year.
We shouldwrite down the company’s value by
$148,370”—the present value of $8,000 per
year inmy example. In the health-status insur-
ance model, the insurer would pay out
$148,370. The company would then have no
more long-termobligations and the consumer
would have no long-term contract to enforce.
The implications of periodically settling
up a long-term contract are profound, and
they solve the second problem of long-term
individual contracts. Sick people must stay
with their original insurer forever in a guaran-
teed-renewable contract, whereas a health-sta-
tus insurance payment frees them to choose
another insurer. People value choice. As
Thomas Buchmueller and colleagues write:
People do not want to be locked into
the same health insurance plan year
after year. When new medical services
are developed, people want access to
those services. . . . If people move, they
want to be covered by new providers,
not the providers in the town they
moved from. Under guaranteed-renew-
able policies, only those who remain
healthy can hope to switch coverage.7
If people are bound to one insurance carri-
er, furthermore, the original insurer doesn’t
have any incentive to treat sickpeoplewell. Yes,
reputation and court enforcement of con-
tracts can help to prevent insurers from treat-
ing sick people badly. But the freedom to leave
is amuchmore effective force to keep insurers
and providers on their toes. Competition for
people with long-term diseases will also
induce the wholemedical industry to improve
treatment of those diseases.
Finally, insurance companies don’t last
forever. They can go bankrupt, change own-
ers, change policies, and so forth. Periodically
retrieving the present value of long-term
promises adds to the safety of any contract.
We do not have to have a policy debate
between guaranteed-renewable and health-
status insurance, however. Market partici-
pants candecide howoften it is optimal to set-
tleup, as longasbothoptions arepermittedby
law and regulation. Guaranteed-renewable
individual insurance is also a great start,
because it provides a natural stepping stone to
health-status insurance without requiring
major policy shifts.
What about Adverse Selection?
People who know they are sick and can
hide it tend tobuymore insurance,which the-
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oretically can cause insurance markets to
unravel. Realistically, however, “adverse selec-
tion” is not a serious problem for long-term
health insurance markets. True adverse selec-
tion refers to things patients know that the
insurer cannot know—what economists call
“asymmetric information.” But does a patient
who knows his or her aches and pains really
knowmore than an insurer can learn by look-
ing at his or her entire medical history and a
careful health exam? (Hiding one’s history is
fraud, and can invalidate a contract.)
If we observe adverse selection in today’s
marketplace, it is because government artifi-
cially forbids insurers from using informa-
tion they do posses to chargemore for people
whom everyone knows are going to be more
expensive. This fact does not represent a fun-
damental information problem that would
stop a less-regulated market from working.
Adverse selection is exactly the same issue
for health-status insurance as it is for long-
term insurance with a single company. The
portability engineered by lump-sum pay-
ments doesn’t make adverse selection any
better or worse. So at a minimum, this isn’t a
special issue for health-status insurance.
What Needs to Be Done
What policy steps should be taken instead
to allow health-status insurance to emerge?
The basic message is “get out of the way,” but
we need to describe a set of steps that nervous
regulators and politicians could actually take.
First, we should eliminate the tax and regu-
latory preferences for employer-provided group
health insurance. Employers can still pay for
insurance, or even provide medical insurance.
We could even retain the tax-advantaged status
of health insurance payments by companies or
individuals. Those features cause many distor-
tions, but those distortions don’t harm long-
term insurance. It is crucial that the employee
owns any health-status insurance account, just
as he or she owns defined-contribution retire-
ment accounts and health savings accounts.
Thatway, if theemployeegetssickandleaves,he
or she always has the resources to purchase a
medical insurance policy. If long-term health
insurance is bundledwithmedical insurance, it
is important that this is an individual, portable
policy—nomatter who pays for it.
Second, we need to allow and encourage
insurers to adjust medical insurance premi-
ums freely, so that anyone can get coverage,
albeit at a price, and so that healthy people
will not flee the market. Finally, we should
lift the many other competitive restraints on
insurers.8
We do not need a carefully planned and
choreographed deregulation. Once we
remove the tax and regulatory preferences for
employer-based group insurance, much of
the rest will follow naturally. We will first see
muchmore individual insurance emerge, and
that insurance is already incentive compati-
ble, guaranteed renewable, and portable.
Competition and consumer demand for the
freedom to change insurers will push insur-
ers toward the incentive-compatible front-
loaded premium structure with periodic set-
tling-up clauses. Health-status insurance
accounts will follow quickly if you think
about how the insurance contracts are writ-
ten. As health-status insurance develops,
there will be no reason not to allow insurers
to fully risk-rate medical insurance policies
and compete ruthlessly. Each step can coexist
with the last and can happen as quickly or
slowly as regulators are willing to let go.
Regulators could help, too. They could
encouragemedical insurers to publish explic-
it premiumschedules based onhealth risk, so
that health-status payments can bemore eas-
ily calculated. Insurers may rightly fear that
publication of such a premium schedule now
would draw all sorts of political and regula-
tory ire. Hearing the opposite would help.
Markets Are Showing
theWay
It is encouraging that even inourhighly reg-
ulated environment, the individual market is
alreadymoving in thedirectionofhealth-status
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insurance. Three-quarters of private medical
insurance policies were guaranteed renewable
evenbefore this featurewasmandated in1996.9
Bradley Herring andMark Pauly find evidence
that individual health insurance premiums are
beginningtoreflect the front-loaded“incentive-
compatible” structure,10 which exactly mimics
medical plus health-status insurance premi-
ums. Most encouraging of all, the
UnitedHealth Group, one of the nation’s
largest health insurers, just announced a prod-
uct that gives customers the right to buy med-
ical insurance in the future. The future premi-
um will be based on the customer’s current
health status, even if their healthworsens in the
interim. TheNew York Times reports:
“What this product is designed to do,
for a verymodest premium, is to essen-
tially protect your insurability for the
future,” said Richard A. Collins, the
president of UnitedHealth’s individual
insurance unit, who says he is the first
policy holder. His monthly fee is $50.11
This product only gives customers the right
to buy a UnitedHealth policy, rather than a
policy from any insurance company. But it is
clearly a big step toward full health-status
insurance. Further steps may be forthcom-
ing. The Times continues:
Private insurers are increasingly inter-
ested in comingupwith newplans that
offer coverage even to those individuals
with pre-existing conditions, said Bob
Vineyard, an insurance broker in
Atlanta.He said he expected suchplans
to be introduced next year.12
Markets can provide long-term, portable
insurance—but only if we allow them to do so.
Competition and
Regulation
Why then dowe have such a regulated sys-
tem? If deregulation would quickly solve our
most pressing health insurance problem,
why haven’t we deregulated it already? There
is in fact a clear story for how we got stuck
where we are. Understanding this story can
give us confidence that the deregulatory path
outlined above will work, and it shows us
why further regulation will not cure the
health insurance system.
Employer-provided group insurance is the
dominant form of medical insurance in the
United States, encouraged by a strong tax
advantage and regulatory pressure. The tax
advantage emerged in WWII, as a way for
firms to attract workers in the face of federal
wage and price controls,13 not from any care-
ful study of long-term health insurance.
Group insurance is a long-term pooling
arrangement. The premiums of healthy people
cross-subsidize the expensesof thosewith long-
term illnesses over long periods. Competition
undermines long-term pools. A competitive
insurer can woo the healthy away with a lower
premium, leaving the original insurerwithonly
sick people.14 And people with long-term ill-
nesseswho lose their joborother tie to thepool
won’t be able to join another pool in a compet-
itivemarket.
However, these problems were not evident
when health insurance markets first emerged
and health expenses were largely temporary.
There wasn’t much one could do about the
chronic conditions for which we now have
expensive treatments. The long-term insur-
ance problem emerged as expensive treat-
ments for long-term conditions became avail-
able.
A lot of health insurance regulationmakes
somesensewhenviewedas apatchworkaimed
at trying to prohibit competitive forces from
undermining long-term pools. The federal tax
exemption for employment-based group
insurance does not allow healthy workers to
direct their employer’s pre-tax premium con-
tributions, or their own pre-tax dollars, to an
individual plan. This fact forces healthy work-
ers to stay in their employer’s plan and to
cross-subsidize the sick. Additional regula-
tions to encourage employer-sponsored group
insurance help workers with illnesses to get
9
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coverage at anew job if they leave their oldone.
Regulations that limit risk-rating and exclu-
sions for preexisting conditions or that man-
date coverage of certain conditions try to force
the individualmarket to be a catch-all for peo-
ple who have lost group coverage. Restrictions
on competition attempt to keep insurers from
poaching each other’s healthy customers.
Most policy proposals aimed at providing
better long-term health insurance try to fur-
ther limit competition and expand forced
pooling. They strengthen incentives for
employer-provided group insurance, create
pools based on geography (e.g., the Clinton
administration’s 1993 proposal), force insur-
ers to take all comers at the same price, assign
high risks to insurers, prohibit competition
for healthy customers, force (or “mandate”)
healthy people to buy high-priced insurance,
mandate payment levels and treatments for
expensive diseases, and so forth.
Alas, each of these steps reduces competi-
tion, and reduces people’s freedom to choose
the insurers and providers that best serve their
needs. That reduction begets poor service,
higher costs, and less innovation. Reducing
competition and choice is not an unfortunate
side effect of the regulatory approach to long-
term insurance—it is the point of that ap-
proach.Competitionundermines forcedpool-
ing arrangements, so to strengthen forced
pooling, you have to reduce competition.
Even these sterner measures will not be
enough, so long as people have any need or
freedom to change pools. National health
insurance—a single, mandatory pool—is the
onlyway to provide ironclad long-term insur-
ance following this logic. But national health
insurance completely eliminates consumer
choice and insurer competition.
We seem to face an unpalatable tradeoff
between competition and choice on one
hand and better long-term insurance on the
other. Health-status insurance removes this
unpleasant tradeoff. With health-status
insurance, a completely deregulated market
with complete freedom and competition can
also provide lifetime portable health insur-
ance.
The Obama Plan
As I write, the most relevant health care
reform proposal is the one presented by
President Barack Obama’s campaign. It is a
good specific example of these general points.
The Obama campaign plan promised to
bring “portability and choice” to health insur-
ance. It promised that Americans “will be able
to move from job to job without changing or
jeopardizing their health care coverage.” It
called for “stable premiums that will not
dependonhowhealthyyouare,” andpromised
that “no American will be turned away from
any insurance plan because of illness or pre-
existing conditions.”15 Those goals are exactly
what health-status insurance can accomplish.
Unfortunately, the Obama campaign pro-
posals go in the standard direction of
reduced competition, forced pooling, and
mandates. For example, the Obama cam-
paign plan proposes a “National Health
Insurance Exchange” through which the fed-
eral government would ban pre-existing con-
dition clauses and force insurance companies
to take everyone at the same price. The cam-
paign plan proposes tomandate coverage for
children and most workers. It foresees, and
indeed promises, the inevitable result of a
nationalized health-insurance system:
Obama will make available a new
national health plan . . . The plan will
cover all essential medical services,
including preventive, maternity, and
mental health care. . . . Individuals and
families who . . . need financial assis-
tance will receive an income-related
federal subsidy to buy into the new
public plan.16
Clearly, President Obama and his health
policy advisers are genuinely concerned about
long-term insurance, and they recognize that
choice, competition, and lower costs are desir-
able in health care. They are neither for nor
against health-status insurance in any mean-
ingful sense. They simply have never heard of
10
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it. They advocatemore regulation and nation-
alized health insurance simply because they,
like most people, think they have to choose
between long-term insurance and competi-
tion. They do not know that amarket alterna-
tive that delivers both is possible. If they knew
about it, there is no reason they should not
embrace it.
Conclusion
With health-status insurance, a complete-
ly private, less-regulated, and competitive
insurance market can solve the central prob-
lem of health insurance in America: the lack
of secure long-term portable protection from
health risks. We need not choose between
freedom and competition on one hand, and
long-term health security on the other.
Markets can deliver both.
Getting there requires us to move in
exactly the opposite direction of current reg-
ulation and most policy proposals. We need
to end the tax and regulatory preference for
employer-provided group insurance over
portable individual insurance, not strength-
en that pressure. We need to allow medical
insurers to compete—to chargemore for peo-
ple with long-term expensive conditions and
less for healthy people—not prohibit them
from doing so. We need to allow health-sta-
tus insurance to emerge so that people can be
insured against higher costs.
Any good policymaker looks for market
failure before regulating something. Where is
the market failure behind bans on risk-based
premiums, medical insurance competition, or
tax preferences favoring employer-provided
group health insurance? No one has seriously
documented natural monopoly, missing
property rights, adverse selection, asymmetric
information, or any conventional source of
market failuremotivating these interventions,
or preventing the emergence of private long-
term health insurance. Those regulations
emerged as a patchwork response to the his-
torical accident of employer-provided group
insurance, not as a coherent regulatory pro-
gram to address market failure. However, we
have not so far had a vision of how a com-
pletely free market could provide long-term
and fully portable health insurance. Without
that vision, one could have a nagging sense
that there is some hiddenmarket failure.
At a minimum, the possibility of health-
status insurance gives us that vision, reassur-
ing us that there are no such failures, and
that these are needless regulations. Free-mar-
ket economists no longer need to hem and
haw, saying, “Well you have a point there, but
do we have to make the regulation quite so
intrusive?” We can instead say with confi-
dence, “We can have long-term insurance
with a less-regulated health insurance mar-
ket, and here’s how.”
Of course, I also hope that it actually hap-
pens: that our government takes the simple
steps necessary to let long-term health insur-
ance emerge in place of highly regulated
long-term pooling systems. We could then
watch with delight as the resulting competi-
tion does its usual magic of raising quality,
lowering costs, and spurring innovation in
both health care delivery and finance.
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